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Reproducing low wage labour: capital accumulation, labour markets, and 
young workers 
 
 
Edward Yates, University of Leicester 
 
Abstract: 
 
Drawing on evidence from Greater Manchester, this paper examines how structural changes 
in capital accumulation have created particular labour market outcomes which have led to 
young people becoming a source of cheap labour for the growing low-wage service economy.   
Greater Manchester has been selected as a case study due to the sectoral composition of its 
labour market, and because levels of low-pay for young workers are above the national 
average of 40%.  The research reveals that it is necessary to move beyond sociological 
explanations that concentrate on the ³essential youthfulness´RI\RXQJpeople, and instead 
draw on analytical categories from political economy in order to understand the structural 
causes of \RXQJSHRSOH¶V material circumstances.   
 
Keywords: economic change, employment, capital accumulation, labour markets, young 
people. 
Introduction  
 
This paper explores the relationship between conditions of work and employment 
experienced by young workers, and capital accumulation.  It aims to understand the labour 
market conditions experienced by young people by situating these within broader processes 
of political economy.  This aim is achieved by focusing on the purchase, sale, and usage of 
the labour-power of young workers.  This treatment is not a comprehensive coverage of all 
forms of youth labour in the contemporary economy.  It does not include, for example, 
enforced or trafficked labour, voluntary or unpaid labour.  By not including these types of 
labour the aim is not to detract from their significance in the contemporary economy.  Rather, 
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the aim is to provide greater focus and clarity on the conditions of wage-labour for young 
workers in contemporary labour markets.  The paper seeks to advance understandings of 
young workers in labour markets by answering two interrelated questions: first, what are the 
main factors affecting the position of young workers in contemporary labour markets, and 
second; how do these factors relate to processes of capitalist production.  Existing research 
suggests evidence of worsening labour market conditions for young people 1 ; the youth 
unemployment rate is currently 13.7%, 2.7 times higher than all-age unemployment2 (ONS, 
2016a), and the youth unemployment ratio3 is 20.2%, an historical high in the UK 2¶5HLOO\
et al., 2015).  Similarly, whilst 21% of all-age workers in the UK are in low-paid employment 
the number is 40% for workers aged 21-25 and 77% for workers aged 16-20 (Clarke & 
'¶$UF\   Young workers often ILQG WKHPVHOYHV µFKXUQLQJ¶ EHWZHHQ LQVHFXUH RU
µSUHFDULRXV¶ZRUNDQGSHULRGVRIunemployment (MacDonald, 2009; Standing, 2011), whilst  
recent research by Gregg and Gardiner (2015) has shown a deepening of insecure 
employment conditions for specific segments of the labour force, particularly for young 
workers in the UK. 
 
Greater Manchester is a metropolitan county made up of ten metropolitan boroughs.4  As of 
2016, total employment is over 1.3 million, of which approximately 187, 000 are aged 16-24.  
The county has been selected as a case study because its labour market conditions reflect 
those of the UK more generally; its labour market is characterised by low-waged employment 
in service sector occupations, alongside diminishing levels of employment across the public 
and manufacturing sectors.  Across Greater Manchester there are large variations in numbers 
of \RXQJSHRSOHFODLPLQJ-REVHHNHU¶V$OORZDQFH-6$LQ)HEUXDU\QRUWKHUQboroughs 
of the county had an average youth JSA claimant rate of around 13.6%, whereas southern 
boroughs had a youth JSA claimant rate of as low as 6.9%.  The average for the UK during 
this period was 8.5% (ONS 2012).  Incidences of low-paid employment ± defined as 
employment in which pay is two-thirds below the median income - are higher amongst young 
workers in Greater Manchester than they are amongst young workers nationally.  57% of 
                                                 
1
 Young is defined as aged 16- 24.  This definition is in line with ONS and ILO definitions.    
2
 All-age unemployment is 5.1%, as of 2016.   
3The youth unemployment ratio is calculated by dividing the number of young unemployed by the number 
young employed, unemployed, and economically inactive.  The youth unemployment rate, by contrast, is 
calculated by dividing the number of young unemployed by the employed, and unemployed.  The former is seen 
as a more useful figure when analysing youth unemployment as it takes into consideration young people who 
are economically, such as full-time students, full-time carers, and those who are inactive through illness.   
4These are; Bolton, Bury, Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford, and Wigan.   
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young workers are in low-paid work in the North West region of the UK, compared with 52% 
nationally (New Economy, 2016a).  In addition, hourly and weekly rates of pay for all-age 
workers are 7.8% below the UK average, with 22.5% of all-age workers being employed in 
low-paid work across Greater Manchester (an increase of 8.3% over a ten-year period).  
Furthermore, 10.6% of workers have no formal qualifications, and wage inequality between 
areas of Greater Manchester is the highest of any metropolitan area in the UK; the gap in 
average wages between the most affluent borough and the least affluent is 26%. (Centre for 
Cities, 2008: 45; Harding et al., 2010; ONS, 2014; LFS, 2015). 
 
This paper exposes the connections between the conditions of young workers and the changes 
which have occurred in Greater Manchester since the 1970s, in what has become known as 
the neoliberal era (Harvey, 2007).  The analysis developed here is different from the 
dominant approach in sociology, which fails to adequately conceptualise young people as 
workers and situate them within the capital-labour relationship.    In order to add to ongoing 
debates on young workers the following approach is taken; section one provides a brief 
overview of the limits of existing literature on young people and highlights the need to 
conceptualise youth in relation to aforementioned categories of political economy. Section 
two explores the main factors affecting young workers by examining three areas of labour 
market change: sectoral and occupational demand, skills demand, and the labour process for 
young workers.  Section three analyses the extent to which young people have become a 
source of low-wage labour for capital.  
1. The political economy of young workers 
 
Existing accounts of young people  
 
The analysis of young people¶VPDWHULDOconditions is made difficult by the manner in which 
young people are commonly conceptualised in existing research, where explanation relies on 
appeals to arbitrary factors such as biology, or intergenerational differences.  Arnett (2000), 
for example, explains the unfavourable position of young workers as being the result of 
ELRORJLFDOIDFWRUVDUJXLQJWKDW\RXQJSHRSOHH[SHULHQFHDSURFHVVRIµHPHUJLQJDGXOWKRRG¶ in 
which they are not fully developed as adults and therefore lack the personal capacities needed 
for stable employment, which only develop in later life (2000: 469).  Willetts (2011) 
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identifies inter-generational economic inequality as the main cause of poor labour market 
conditions for young workers, arguing that it is differences between age cohorts ± notably 
between so-FDOOHGµ%DE\%RRPHUV¶DQGµGeneration X and <¶± which is the most important 
social cleavage (2011: 22-3).  Whilst there has been an increase in inequality between 
generations this is due to changes in how profit is generated by UK-based capitals, rather than 
being an outcome of the conscious and deliberate actions of a particular age cohort.  Part of 
this change is typified by the adoption of low skill, low value-added business strategies by 
firms, and the related shift in employment from manufacturing to services.  Furthermore, it is 
doubtful that generational differences are as important as Willetts suggests; evidence from a 
multi-country study conducted by Grimshaw and Reinecke (2015) demonstrates that it is 
social class, rather than age, which is more influential in shaping labour market outcomes.  
Youth unemployment was 19% more prevalent, and µnot in employment, education or 
training¶ (NEET) status was 22% more prevalent, amongst the bottom economic quintile than 
the top quintile of the youth populations in the countries that were studied (2015: 368-9).   
 
In a survey of the current field of youth studies Côté (2014) notes that there is a need to draw 
upon the discipline of political economy in order to better explain the contemporary 
conditions of young people.  Côté¶V DUJXPHQW FDQ EH LQWHUSUHWHG WR PHDQ WKDW WKHUH LV WKH
need to examine the structures which affect young people within labour markets, rather than 
relying on individualised, agential explanations.  This point is evident in Côté¶V call for a 
SHUVSHFWLYHZKLFKµinvestigates the root causes and consequences of the positioning over time 
of the youth segment in relation to those (adults) in a given society with political and 
HFRQRPLFSRZHU¶ (2014: 528).  Whilst Côté¶V aim is laudable, his argument does not go into 
sufficient detail regarding precisely which type of analytical methods from political economy 
ought to be drawn upon to study young people.  In contrast, this paper suggests that - in order 
to FRXQWHUWRH[SODQDWLRQVZKLFKIRFXVRQWKHHVVHQWLDOµ\RXWKIXOQHVV¶ of young people - it is 
necessary to adopt an approach which understands young people not only as workers but 
which also situates them within capitalist processes of social production and social 
reproduction 5 .  This approach facilitates analysis using analytical categories of capital, 
labour, the state, and social class.  In taking this approach, the aim is not to deny that age is 
                                                 
5
 Production is used here to refer to the process of producing commodities for sale in a market with the aim of 
realising profit.  The buying and selling of labour-power with the aim of generating profit is a key aspect of the 
production process.  Social reproduction is used here to refer to process through which labour reproduces itself.  
Central to social reproduction is the usage of the wage labour has earnt through selling its labour-power in order 
to purchase commodities necessary to sustain itself and its dependents.   
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irrelevant.  However, explanations of young pHRSOH¶Vmaterial status which identify age as a 
causal factor can become little more than tautology (Fine, 1992).  Identifying age as a causal 
factor can lead to claims that young people experience unfavourable labour market conditions 
precisely because they are young, and that poor quality employment conditions in which 
young people work ought to be tolerated beFDXVH VXFK MREV DUH QRW µSURSHU¶ jobs, but are 
LQVWHDG µVWXGHQW¶RU µ\RXWK¶ MREVwhich are not worthy of decent pay or conditions due the 
very fact that young people are employed in them (Tannock, 2001; Sukarieh and Tannock, 
2014).  Such an approach ignores the historical factors which shape labour markets and fails 
to ask why these material conditions prevail.  The work of Ashton et al. (1990) identifies 
significant structural economic changes as a major factor impacting the position of young 
people in labour markets, arguing that as sectors of the labour market shrink in terms of total 
employment they become shut off to young people, who are pushed to the back of job queues 
due to perceived inexperience.  This exclusion of young people means that they become 
clustered in certain sectors or occupations which, because of the numbers of young people 
HPSOR\HG LQ WKHP EHFRPH YLHZHG DV µ\RXWK MREV¶ unworthy of equal levels of pay or 
employment status (Ashton et al., 1990; Grimshaw, 2014).  The importance of structural 
factors - in particular, structural change in the form which capital accumulation takes - is 
therefore critical to understanding why young people experience particular labour market 
conditions.   
2. The material conditions of young people in labour markets  
 
The neoliberal period has been once of immense changes which have restructured the UK 
economy.  Notable amongst these are the decline of manufacturing and the rise of service 
sector employment, the decline in trade union membership, and the emergence of 
financialised forms of capital accumulation (Clarke, 2001; McNally, 2009; Fine, 2013; 
Harvey, 2014; Soederberg, 2014).  These changes have continued largely uninterrupted over 
the last four decades, irrespective of which political party has been in power (Lehndorff, 
2012), and the result is altered labour markets and working conditions in the UK for young 
(and all-age) workers.  The underlying causes of these changes can be better understood by 
situating them within broader changes which have occurred at the level of UK political 
economy.  After the post-war period of economic growth began to slow in the UK, young 
people began to become affected by worsening labour market conditions.  The 1970s saw the 
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collapse of WKHµ\RXWKODERXUPDUNHW¶ (Maguire and Maguire, 1997), as core features of post-
war system of labour market regulation - wages councils, tripartite negotiation, and broad-
reaching collective bargaining agreements -   were dismantled (Brown et al., 2009).  These 
changes led to more difficult transitions into employment for young people, a trend which 
continued into the 1980s (Brynner and Roberts, 1992).  This period saw the abandonment of 
any residual policy commitments to full employment; instead, the control of inflation through 
monetarist economic policies were prioritised (Clarke, 1988).  The policy shifts and the 
recession of the early 1990s were the surface manifestations of deeper contradictions within 
the capitalist world economy, which led to a rise in unemployment amongst both young and 
all-age workers; in Greater Manchester during this period there was a 30% increase in 
joblessness in 1990-91 alone (Peck and Emmerich, 1992: 29).  The Conservative government 
of the time UHFODVVLILHG PDQ\ \RXQJ SHRSOH DV µWUDLQHHV¶ WKURXJK SURJUDPPHV VXFK DV WKH
Youth Training Scheme in what might be judged retrospectively a cynical attempt to solve 
WKHSUREOHPRIULVLQJ\RXWKXQHPSOR\PHQW7KLVKDGWKHGXDODLPRIµZDUHKRXVLQJ¶\RXWKRQ
redundant training courses in order to reduce unemployment figures, and lowering the costs 
RI\RXWK ODERXU WUDLQHHV¶ wages were around half the adult wage at the time (Finn, 1987).  
These historical changes in youth labour markets provide a starting point for understanding 
the contemporary conditions facing young workers.  There are three main areas where labour 
market changes can be seen as having affected young people the most: changes in sectoral 
and occupational composition of labour markets; changes in the skills demanded by 
employers, and; the labour process for young people. 
 
Sectoral and occupational change for young people 
 
There has been significant decline in employment in certain sectors of the UK labour market 
since the mid-1960s, notably, manufacturing and engineering, and primary sectors such as 
coal, oil, and gas extraction (Martin and Rowthorn, 1986).  Since the 1980s there has also 
been a gradual, punctuated decline in the public sector employment, in particular local 
government (ONS, 2016b). In their place has been the rise of jobs in the service sector: 
transport and logistics; retail and hospitality; tourism; financial and professional services; and 
personal services, such as care work and hairdressing (ONS, 2013).  In Greater Manchester 
between 1995 and 2015 employment in manufacturing fell from 21.6% to 8.8%, whereas in 
the same period employment in the service sector rose from 69.4% to 85.9% (LFS, 2014; 
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New Economy, 2015). It is an oversimplification to attribute all changes in labour markets as 
being the result of a shift from manufacturing to services; the term ³VHUYLFH VHFWRU´ is too 
broad to describe the changes which have affected labour markets, and the term masks the 
qualitative changes which have occurred in work and employment of young people (Poynter, 
2000: 3-20).    In particular, the term obfuscates the manner in which there have been shifts in 
the occupational distribution of the workforce, leading to an increase in low skilled, low wage 
jobs at the bottom end of the labour market.  The increase in low wage work has occurred 
alongside an increasing polarisation of wage rates, which has taken place both in Greater 
Manchester and across the UK (McGovern et al., 2007). 
 
A fundamental change has been the move from a productive economy in which exports 
manufactured goods formed a large percentage of gross domestic product, to an economy 
based increasingly on services, in particular financial services.  The UK manufacturing sector 
declined significantly from the 1970s onwards; between 1980 and 1984 alone there was a 
25% fall in manufacturing, measured in terms of employment (Hobsbawm, 1994: 304-5).  
Employment in the service sector, by contrast, has risen sharply, and now accounts for over 
82% of all jobs in the UK, up from 58% in 1979 (ONS, 2010; 2016b).  Around 7% of these 
jobs are in the financial sector, a sector which hDVJURZQDVWKH8.¶VHFRQRP\KDVEHFRPH
LQFUHDVLQJO\ µILQDQFLDOLVHG¶ )LQH   These changes have affected labour market 
outcomes for young workers.  The decline of manufacturing as an employer has led to the 
GHFOLQHRIµVKLHOGHG¶HQWU\-level positions such as apprenticeships, and has also reduced the 
SUHYDOHQFH RI LQWHUQDO ODERXU PDUNHWV LQ FHUWDLQ µZKLWH FROODU¶ RFFXSDWLRQV ZLWKLQ WKH
manufacturing sector, which allowed opportunities for occupational progression (Ashton et 
al., 1990; McGovern et al., 2007: 21).  Internal labour markets have also diminished in the 
public sector due the action of successive governments form the 1980s onwards, which 
fragmented, casualised, and privatised services such as utilities, transport, and, more recently, 
local government services and social care (Nolan and Slater, 2003; Gamble, 2016).  Sectoral 
change has also led to growth in employment in new sectors for young people, notably retail 
and hospitality, and business services.  In these sectors, existing research demonstrates there 
is limited capacity for occupational progression and that many of the jobs are low-SDLGµGHDG
HQG¶ jobs which do not offer substantive training provision and opportunities for promotion 
(Roberts, 2011).  Nearly a quarter of all employment in Greater Manchester is in low-waged 
work of this type, slightly above the national average of 21.2% (New Economy, 2016a).  A 
further problem facing young workers is that both internal and occupational labour markets 
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are becoming increasingly µKRXU-glaVVHG¶, meaning that there are fewer mid- and higher-level 
positions available, even with the required qualifications and experience (Nolan, 2004; Goos 
and Manning, 2007; Anderson, 2009). 
 
An altered sectoral composition of the labour market has led to shifts in the occupational 
distribution of young workers.  In Greater Manchester, in the period 2001-20116 there was a 
3% fall in the numbers of young people occupying jobs in the top three occupational 
categories, and a 2% rise in the numbers of young people working in elementary occupations 
(ONS, 2001; 2011). This quantitative change is matched by qualitative change in labour 
markets which have impacted young people; from 1981-1996 Greater Manchester gained 187 
000 jobs in services, making up for the 186 000 jobs which had been lost in manufacturing 
(Harding et al., 2010) (see table 1). Much of this growth has been in business and 
professional services - which is now the largest single sectoral employer in Greater 
Manchester - and retail and hospitality.  Young workers in Greater Manchester are nearly 
twice as likely to be employed in elementary occupations as all-age workers, and are nearly 
2.5 times as likely to be employed in sales and customer service occupations as all-age 
workers, making up 22% and 33% of these occupational workforces, respectively  (ONS, 
2012).  The decline of internal and occupational labour markets has led to increasing amounts 
young people who try to enter into certain sectors having to participate in what are known as 
µHQWU\WRXUQDPHQWV¶7KLVLVWKHSURFHVVE\ZKLFKFDQGLGDWHVPXVWRSHQO\FRPSHWHIRUMREV
in a particular sector or firm because institutions which regulate entry no longer exist, or have 
never existed (Marsden, 2010: 1).   
 
TABLE 1 
 
Skills, education and training 
 
The prevalence of entry tournaments is symptomatic of the overall levels of increased 
competitiveness for decent jobs amongst young people in labour markets.  Another indicator 
RI WKLV LV WKH LQFUHDVH LQ µFUHGHQWLDOLVP¶ ± the process by which jobs come to require 
qualifications when previously they did not (UKCES, 2012).  Credentialism has been caused 
                                                 
6
 The time period 2001-2011 is used as the only age-stratified sub-regional data on the occupational and sectoral 
distribution of workers is UK Census data, which is conducted each decade.  The last UK Census was conducted 
in 2010.  
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in part by the increased number of young graduates seeking employment in labour markets 
ZKHUH WKHUH DUH QRW HQRXJK µJUDGXDWH MREV¶7 available.  In 1995 the number of students 
enrolled in higher education in the UK was 1.5 million.  As of 2016 the figure was 2.3 
million, an increase of 53% (HEFA, 1996; 2016).  As a result of this increase employers can 
request that candidates possess a degree as a way of filtering the large numbers of applicants.   
This creates increasingly competitive labour market conditions for non-graduates, who have 
to compeWHIRUDGHFUHDVLQJQXPEHUVRI³non-JUDGXDWH´MREVThe majority of UK graduates - 
60% - are now employed in non-graduate occupations; a situation which has led to over a 
third of UK graduates being employed in jobs in which they are underutilised, meaning that 
they could handle more demanding work which matched their qualifications and skills 
(CIPD, 2015).  
 
Despite research highlighting the limits of skills-based solutions to labour market problems of 
low pay and low productivity governments continue to focus on the role of skills, or 
perceived lack of skills amongst potential employees, as the dominant factor affecting weak 
labour market performance (Lloyd and Payne, 2002; 2016).   Whilst there is some evidence 
from Greater Manchester that employers report skills shortages as being the biggest problem 
preventing business growth (MCC, 2016), this does not mean that greater skills acquisition 
by young workers will improve the overall quality of work, employment, and labour markets.  
Part of the problem stems from lack of clarity surrounding the meaning of the term µVNLOOV¶
which can be used to refer to anything from the possessing specific technical knowledge, to 
the ability to follow orders in a disciplined manner.  In many low-discretion, low-paid, 
URXWLQH ZRUN WKH µVNLOOV¶ ZKLFK HPSOR\HUV ZDQW most from their workers are the ability to 
submit to the authority of management and not complain about poor working conditions or 
levels of remuneration.  As Payne (2017) notes, the current theory of skills subscribed to by 
policymakers is that of human capital theory (Becker, 1967).  In this approach to skills 
individuals invest in the development of WKHLU RZQ µKXPDQ FDSLWDO¶ through undergoing 
education and training with the aim of obtaining higher wages in the future.  This method of 
skills development is viewed as a largely unproblematic process which ultimately leads to 
overall increased economic productivity (Payne, 2017: 55-6).  A problem with human capital 
theory is it ignores the structural factors which may prevent particular individuals or groups 
from accessing the educational resources to increase their human capital (2017: 57).   
                                                 
7
 The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) define a graduate job as one which requires 15 
to 16 years of education (CIPD, 2015).  
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Individualised accounts of skills are also problematic as they detract from systemic problems 
in UK labour markets, notably the failings of successive governments and employers to 
regulate labour markets in such a way as to provide substantive training opportunities and 
decent work.  Clear evidence that lack of skilled workers is not the reason for low pay and 
low productivity is that there has been a growth in employment in occupations at the bottom 
end of the labour market at a time when there has been an increase in the number of qualified 
graduates entering the labour market.  More precisely, there has been growth in employment 
in non-routine, manual occupations which cannot be easily automated (Nolan and Slater, 
2010).  This is true in Greater Manchester, where there has been employment growth in both 
retail and hospitality, and care work, two sectors where the labour process is characterised by 
tasks which cannot be easily replaced by machines (New Economy, 2015a). As has been 
previously stated, young people are disproportionately likely to be employed in these sectors 
in Greater Manchester.   
 
A recurrent theme in the literature on skills is that education fulfils several purposes, one of 
which being that it inculcates young people with the characteristics, skills, and temperaments 
necessary for them to participate as labourers within processes of capitalist accumulation.  An 
example of this in the modern era is the trait of µemployability¶ 0RRUH, which can 
refer to how the aim of education has shifted from providing qualifications and skills needed 
for specific employment, towards equipping young people with the µsoft skills¶ necessary to 
EHµMRE-UHDG\¶LQRUGHU compete in modern labour markets (Andrews and Higson, 2008).  The 
promotion of employability reflects the desire of UK state managers to increase the 
competitiveness of the UK ODERXUIRUFHLQDQHUDRIµK\SHU-IOH[LEOH¶ODERXUPDUNHts in which 
the UK faces increasing competition from both OECD and newly-industrialising countries as 
it seeks to attract capital investment (Amoore, 2002; Nunn, 2012).  This change in 
educational priorities also reflects changing labour market conditions; there are now far fewer 
stable µMREV IRU OLIH¶ and workers are increasingly likely to change employment over the 
course of their working lives (Sennett, 2011).  One aspect of this change is shown by the 
increase in atypical or non-standard forms of employment in the UK, such as fixed-term and 
zero-hours contracts, part-time and agency work.  Since the 2007 recession full-time 
employment has increased by 1.7% in Greater Manchester.  Temporary employment, by 
contrast, has grown by 23.4% and part-time employment by 12% (New Economy, 2016b).     
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Young people are at the forefront of these changes, and as such policymakers regularly 
promote the notion that young people must uncritically embrace them in order to flourish 
(Sukarieh and Tannock, 2016).  The inculcation of entrepreneurialism amongst young people 
as a supposed panacea for their labour market problems is another example of how state 
institutions attempt to foster new skills of self-reliance in changed labour market 
circumstances.  In Greater Manchester there exists local schemes to promote 
entrepreneurialism amongst young people, alongside pressures from Department for Work 
and Pensions staff to persuade unemployed young people to become self-employed, in order 
to simultaneously reduce welfare spending, and attempt to create a culture of enterprise 
(Burrows, 1991; Barnes, 2013).  In Greater Manchester, since 2007 32% of all employment 
growth has been growth in self-employment (New Economy, 2016b: 18).  
 
Despite claims from some research that young people are happy with labour market 
insecurity (Wynn and Dwyer, 1999; Roberts, 2009: 262), it seems more accurate to state that 
labour market change represents a worsening of opportunities for youth.  As Ainley and 
Allen (2013) note, there has been as shift from a situation of µWUDLQLQJZLWKout MREV¶ LQ WKH
VWRµHGXFDWLRQZLWKRXWMREV¶LQWKHSUHVHQWHUD (2013:1).  Instead, the social category of 
µVWXGHQW¶- which applies to around 45% of young people - can be seen as legitimating low-
paid work and poor quality conditions of employment, as jobs which are categorised as 
µVWXGHQW MREV¶FDQEHFRPHGHHPHGXQZRUWK\RIGHFHQWSD\ training, or workplace dignity.  
This situation is possible as employers perceive young people¶VHPSOR\PHQWDVWHPSRUDU\or 
transitory (Sukharieh and Tannock, 2014).  Increasing numbers of young people are 
remaining in both further and higher education; Keep and James (2011) note that in 1976 
µRYHU\HDUROGVZHUH LQZRUN LQ WKLVZDVGRZn to 40% [due to the]  pull of 
higher education and the push of lack of youth jobs¶ (2012: 4). At the same time, financial 
support to students is diminishing and educational costs are rising. It is likely that these 
material changes explain the large numbers of students who engage in work whilst at 
university.  45% of students work part-time whilst studying, and a further 13% work full-time 
(Gil, 2014).  This student workforce is beneficial to employers, who can rely on it to fill 
vacancies at short-notice.  The nature of such work is characterised by insecurity; research 
has shown the difficulties for trade unions in organising seasonal student workers (Wills, 
2005), who typically only work for an employer for the duration of their studies. 
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However, whilst 45% of young people attend higher education, the other 55% do not.  Those 
who do not must however still remain in education or training, as a result of the raising of the 
participation-age for young people in England and Wales to 18, as of 2015. This strategy is 
part of the goverQPHQW¶VGHVLUHWRXS-skill the UK workforce; this is also a partial aim of the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V desire to increase the number of apprenticeships to three million by 2020 (BIS, 
2015).  Whilst apprenticeships can provide quality work-based training which leads into 
decent employment, there is also evidence of apprenticeships which are in low-paying 
sectors, and which do not offer opportunities for development.  In Greater Manchester the 
largest sectors which recruit apprenticeships are customer services, and business 
administration.  The largest single occupation for apprenticeships is hairdressing (New 
Economy, 2014a: 35-45).  Pay rates for apprenticeships in Greater Manchester are just over 
half of the national average, and there is also evidence of widespread underpayment of 
apprenticeships.  Additionally, research shows that 79% of the apprenticeships which are 
available in Greater Manchester are at intermediate level, which is the lowest skill level of 
apprenticeships. (TUC, 2013; New Economy, 2014a: 49-50).  When apprenticeships are 
viewed at a structural level, in relation to capital accumulation, they can be understood as 
fulfilling several roles.  Most notably, they reduce the cost of youth labour, (the current wage 
for first-year apprentices is £3.40, compared with an average minimum wage of £6.25 for 18-
25s).  There is also the risk that the apprenticeship scheme could become a new way to 
µwarehouse¶ young people who would otherwise be unemployed or competing for jobs with 
all-age workers.  Increasingly, large numbers of apprentices are not young; in Greater 
Manchester alone just under 50% of apprentices are over 25 years old (MCC, 2014).  This is 
in part the result of the re-branding of pre-existing training programmes as apprenticeships, 
but it also supports the claim that there is no longer a distinct youth labour market, and 
instead that young people compete with all-age workers for jobs (MacDonald, 2009: 171).  
Finally, there is the problem that the the provision of apprenticeships in the UK exists within 
WKH 8.¶V ODUJHO\ YROXQWDULVW LQGLYLGXDOLVHG VNLOOV V\VWHP ZKLFK LV EHFRPLQJ LQFUHDVLQJO\
marketised due to the entry of for-profit providers. 
 
The labour process for young workers 
 
The sectoral and occupational shifts which have occurred in labour markets have impacted 
the labour process for young people who are employed in service-based occupations at the 
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bottom end of the labour market.   Service sector employment in retail, hospitality, and 
business services has grown most over the past three decades and as a result these sectors 
now employ over 80% of young workers in Greater Manchester; this is detailed in table 2 
(ONS, 2012).  A feature of service sector employment which is detrimental to young people 
is the tendency of employers to adopt business strategies in which productivity gains are 
achieved through the extension8 or intensification of the working day.  In this accumulation 
PRGHOODERXULVLQHIIHFWµVZHDWHG¶LQRUGHUWRmake it more productive, and therefore more 
profitable.  In Greater Manchester there is evidence to suggest that a low wage, low value-
added business model is the norm amongst service sectors firms; 37.3% of total employment 
DFURVV WKH FRXQW\ LV LQ ZKDW KDV EHHQ ODEHOOHG µPXQGDQH DFWLYLWLHV¶, referring to non-
knowledge intensive manufacturing and service occupations (Folkman et al., 2016: 26).  This 
model contrasts with strategies of increasing productivity which are based upon the utilisation 
of technology, often in conjunction with a well-trained workforce.  Low-wage service sector 
employers which follow this strategy RIµVZHDWLQJ¶ODERXU can be contrasted with employers 
in sectors such as advanced manufacturing, where there is the potential for productivity gains 
to be made through repeated technical innovation and, depending on other factors, this has 
the potential to lead to increased profits, which can lead to increased wages for workers 
(dependent on there being complementary pressure for this from workers).  There is evidence 
of a dependence on strategies of reliance of extension and intensification occurring across 
UK labour markets at a generalised level (Green, 2001), and in specific industries such as 
call-centre based business services (Thompson and Newsome, 2004; Thompson and Smith, 
2010), and retail and hospitality (Maume and Purcell, 2007).    
 
TABLE 2 
 
In such workplaces there is often an intense, target-driven culture and pervasive monitoring 
of performance, with little space for personal autonomy (Woodcock, 2016).  Often the 
technology which is used in these workplaces is for the purpose of observing the workforce 
(Taylor and Bain, 1999; Moore and Robinson, 2016).  Across Greater Manchester, large 
numbers of young people are employed in call centres, which have been relocated to the 
                                                 
8
 In the UK the European Working Time directive prevents individuals from working more than 48 hours a 
week, calculated over a 17 week period.  Individuals can choose to opt out of this if they wish.  One form that 
extension of working day can take is through individuals working unpaid overtime.  In 2016 approximately 
£31.5 billion worth of unpaid overtime was worked in the UK.  0.9% of young people aged 16-19 worked 
unpaid overtime; this figure rose to 7.2% for those aged 20-24 (TUC, 2016; HM Government, 2017). 
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county from the South of the UK due to cheaper rents for business properties, and lower 
average wages (New Economy, 2014b).  The growth of forms of capital accumulation in 
which profit is generated largely through absolute means limits the prospects for sustainable 
work for young people in the future; the strategy of accumulation pursued by service sector 
employers has a tendency to act as a sponge which soaks up more labour, as low wages allow 
high levels of recruitment, increasing the numbers of workers who are in low-paid 
employment and furthering the prominence of a low-wage, low productivity accumulation 
strategy amongst employers (Erdem and Glynn, 2001). 
 
3. Understanding youth as low wage labour 
 
This research has addressed two main research questions; the first related to the main factors 
affecting young workers¶ conditions in labour markets.  These were identified to be changes 
in the sectoral and occupational composition of labour markets, changes in skills demand, 
and changes in the labour process for young workers.  The second research question 
pertained to how these changes can be understood in relation to processes of capital 
DFFXPXODWLRQ7KHFHQWUDOFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ\RXQJSHRSOH¶VODERXUPDUNHWFRQGLWLRQVDQG
capital accumulation is the way in which youth labour-power is used by capital, and how this 
has altered.  At an abstract level, changes WR \RXQJ SHRSOH¶V ODERXU-power can be 
conceptualised in terms of young people having experienced a reduction in the value of their 
labour-power.  This reduction is evident by looking at wage-rates across OECD countries; 
since 1982 the wages share of national income has been less than 56% whereas in the 1970s 
it rose as high as 61% of national income (OECD, 2015).  In the UK, the wage-gap between 
\RXQJDQGDOODJHZRUNHUV LV WKLV LVNQRZQDV WKHµ\RXWKZDJHGLVFRXQW¶ *ULPVKDZ
2014: v).  The changes in labour markets conditions which have occurred have led to 
qualitatively different labour market outcomes for young people.  In particular, there has been 
a shift in the position occupied by young people in labour markets.  In the period prior to the 
1970s there was a youth labour market in which young people could obtain entry-level 
positions with relative ease, as well as having the opportunity to progress into higher jobs in 
higher occupational categories.  In the post-1970s period, this type of labour market has 
largely disappeared.  Instead, young workers are now better conceptualised as providing an 
almost permanent supply of low-waged labour to sectors of the economy which are growing, 
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largely due to these sectors dominated by accumulation strategies which depends on an 
abundant supply of cheap labour.   
 
Conceiving of young people primarily as a source of cheap ODERXUIRUWKH8.¶VFXUrent model 
of accumulation is in contrast to approaches ZKLFKIRFXVRQWKH³HVVHQWLDOyouthfulness´RI
young people as an explanation for youth labour market conditions; it is also an alternative to 
explanations which seek to explain labour market change as being a result of supposedly 
neutral processes such as technological change (Autor et al., 2003) or µglobalisation¶ 
(Blossfeld et al. 2006).  From the evidence presented throughout this paper it is possible to 
argue that the labour market conditions which young people experience are neither accidental 
nor natural, but are rather the result of conflict over how production and social reproduction 
occurs, which manifest concretely in class-based struggles over the nature of work and 
employment in the UK.  These struggles are evident in conflict between organised labour and 
capital, in which young people are under-represented in trade unions; only 5% of UK trade 
union members are aged 16-24 (HM Government, 2015). Conflict is also expressed through 
the state, where young people are politically under-represented.  An outcome of this is 
legislation which discriminates against young workers, such as age-stratified minimum wage 
laws which allow employers to pay young people less for doing the same work as individuals 
aged over 25. 
 
These struggles have been repeatedly evident in UK state policy; in the 1990s, the aim of UK 
government, as stated by the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, was for the UK to become 
a µQR-WHFKHFRQRP\¶LQZKLch competitive advantage of UK-based capitals was to be founded 
on low wages (Rubery, 1994).  Although UK government funding of public sector research 
did increase slightly in the 1990s it was still far below the levels of other OECD countries; 
the UK invested less than half of what Germany did, and less than one-seventh of the US 
(Maass, 2004: 42).   Subsequent economic and labour market policy interventions have 
largely re-enforced this trend; attempts WR µXS-VNLOO¶ the UK working class in the 2000s by 
promoting the expansion of higher education in order to allow UK-based capitals to compete 
in higher value-added did little to remedy the underlying structural problems inherent in UK 
labour markets.  SXFKVWUDWHJLHVZHUHODUJHO\µVXSSO\-siGH¶DQGZHUHQRWDFFRPSDQLHGE\DQ
industrial strategy which was able to increase demand for this up-skilled labour (Nunn, 
2008).  Instead, these interventions merely led to a labour market with higher numbers of 
under-utilised graduates. These structural changes meant that the labour market conditions of 
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young people were already worsening by the mid-2000s, prior to the 2007 crisis (Dickens et 
al., 2011).  Since 2010, the dominant form which labour market interventions towards young 
people have taken are coercive and disciplinary; young people have experienced removal of 
state welfare such as housing benefit, and have been targeted by punitive active labour 
market policies VXFKDVWKHµ:RUN3URJUDPPH¶, DQGµ<RXWK2EOLJDWLRQ¶; these schemes force 
young people to engage in compulsory training or work placements, or have their already 
diminished welfare payments completely removed entirely (HM Treasury, 2010; 2015).  This 
system of labour market regulation has further devalued youth labour-power by transferring 
the cost of social reproduction away from employers and the state, and onto individuals and 
households.   
Conclusions  
 
This paper has demonstrated that it is only by adopting a systematic approach which places 
young people within capitalist relations of production and reproduction WKDW\RXQJSHRSOH¶V
position as workers within capitalist labour market can be adequately theorised and 
explained.   In drawing upon the analytical categories of political economy - notably capital, 
labour, and antagonistic class-based social relations - this paper has sought to challenge 
µHVVHQWLDOLVW¶VRFLRORJLFDOH[SODQDWLRQRIWKHPDWHULDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRI\RXQJSHRSOHZKLFK
are often no better than ad hoc tautology.  An alternative explanation has been put forward 
which situates young people within broader shifts in UK political economy in order to 
demonstrate how young people have become a source of cheap, disciplined, and ultimately 
disposable labour for sectors of the economy which have grown in recent decades.   
 
As this paper has demonstrated, these sectors are characterised by low levels of autonomy, 
low pay, and poor opportunities for career progression.  These changes have been made 
worse by a flawed approach to skills in the UK - which has continued despite the expansion 
of higher education ± DQG E\ D ODERXU SURFHVV ZKLFK LV FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ WKH µVZHDWLQJ¶ RI
workers.  Greater Manchester has been used a case study throughout this paper to 
demonstrate the prevalence of these labour market changes and their outcomes for young 
workers; however, such conditions are evident across labour markets in the UK.  It is 
therefore necessary to explore these conditions further, as the conditions affecting young 
people are likely to worsen if progressive interventions are not made in the areas of 
17 
 
macroeconomic policy, labour market regulation, and industrial strategy, with the aim of 
tackling the structural failings of capital accumulation in the UK and the deleterious 
outcomes it has for young people.   
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Table 1. Employment Change in Greater Manchester (GM) 1984-2015 
 
 
Industry 
Number of employees in major sectors of GM labour market, and as a 
percentage of total workforce 
GM 1981-1985 GM 1994-1995 GM 2004-2005 GM 2014-2015 
manufacturing 346 000 33.2% 230 000 21.6% 162 000 14.0% 104 700 8.8% 
construction 53 000 5.1% 78 000 7.3% 94 000 8.1% 50 400 4.2% 
service sector 617 000 59.2% 738 000 69.4% 878 000 76.3% 1 028 500 85.9% 
Source: NOMIS, Labour Force Survey, New Economy3HFNDQG(PPHULFKDXWKRU¶VRZQ
calculations  
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Table 2. Employment of  16-24 year old and all-age workers in Greater Manchester, by sector 
Employee Jobs By Sector  Employees aged 16-
24 in Greater 
Manchester (%) 
All-age employment in 
Greater Manchester  
 
Greater 
Manchester 
(%) 
 
North West 
Region of 
Great Britain  
(%) 
Great 
Britain  
(%) 
Total Employee Jobs  167 233 (100) 1 196 900 100 100 100 
Primary Services:  Agriculture and 
Mining  
 
2 005 (1.1) 
500 0.0 0.1 0.4 
Energy And Water  12 800 1.1 1.0 1.1 
Manufacturing  8 808 (5.3) 104 700 8.8 10.3 8.5 
Construction  11 031 (6.6) 50 400 4.2 4.5 4.5 
Wholesale And Retail, Including 
Motor Trades  
67 979* (40.6) 190 800 15.9 16.2 15.9 
Transport Storage  8 772** (5.3) 57 400 4.8 4.5 4.5 
Accommodation And Food Services  - 75 300 6.3 7.1 7.1 
Information And Communication  - 37 800 3.2 2.7 4.1 
Financial And Other Business 
Services  
26 492 (15.9) 288 800 24.1 20.5 22.2 
Public Admin, Education And Health  29 921 (17.9) 326 100 27.2 28.5 27.4 
Other Services  12 225 (7.3) 52 400 4.4 4.5 4.4 
Source8.&HQVXV216EXVLQHVVUHJLVWHUDQGHPSOR\PHQWVXUYH\%5(6DXWKRU¶VRZQFDOFXODWLRQV 
Notes: 
*This figure includes accommodation and food services workers.  
**This figure includes information and communication workers.   
